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The Anglo-French Rapprochement and
the Question of Morocco: an Uneasy Way
to the Entente Cordiale, 1898–1904
Marcela Šubrtová
Through the signature of the Entente Cordiale, France and Great Britain settled their
colonial disputes in non-European territories and started the cooperation. The entente
became a milestone towards the birth of the alliances, which later clashed in the First
World War. Based mainly on the non-published documents, this contribution tries to
analyze the motives that permitted the Anglo-French rapprochement from 1898–1904.
Attention is paid to the influences of the world diplomacy on the development of the
negotiations. Furthermore, this article deals with the Moroccan points of contention be-
tween France and Great Britain, which together with the Egyptian question, were of
crucial and strategic importance for the development of the Anglo-French relations.
[Entente Cordiale; Anglo-French relations 1898–1904; Morocco; Lord Lansdowne; Paul
Cambon]
Introduction
In April 1904, nearly a diplomatic revolution took place when the
eternal enemies, Great Britain and France, finally came to terms and
throughout settlement of their mutual difficulties in extra-European
areas concluded alliance, which had far reaching effects upon the later
world diplomacy. However, the origins of the Anglo-French rap-
prochement and final understanding must be seen farther than in
spring of 1904, but as soon as in 1898.
When Théophile Delcassé succeeded Gabriel Hanotaux at the post
of the French Foreign Minister in June 1898, his vision was to improve
the French diplomatic position. He was reported to have said: “I do
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not wish to leave this desk without having restored the good understanding
with England.”1 He was in between two millstones since his genuine
desire was to make the Anglo-French rapprochement come true but
on the other hand he was sincerely devoted to the cause of ending
the British occupation of Egypt.2 In the autumn of 1898 the Anglo-
French relations became tight because of the existing struggle for the
Upper Nile basin. Jean-Baptiste Marchand led an expedition from the
French Congo to the Upper Nile and hoped that the French presence
in the area would force the British to reopen the Egyptian question.
Marchand reached Fashoda on July 10, 1898 and hoisted there the Tri-
colour. The British mission for the re-conquest of Sudan, controlled
by religious fanatic Khalifa, disciple of Mahdi, had already begun by
that time. On September 2, 1898 the Mahdists were defeated in the
battle of Omdurman by Anglo-Egyptian army led by Horatio Herbert
Kitchener and the British forces then continued south in the direction
towards the confluence of Sobat and White Nile, to Fashoda.
On September 7, 1898 Delcassé met Edmund Monson, British Am-
bassador in London, and since he had already received news of the
victorious battle of Omdurman, he was worried and told British Am-
bassador that Captain Marchand had received “the clearest instructions
as to his position and attitude” and that “he had been distinctly told that he
is nothing but an emissary of civilisation” and emphasized, that “all out-
standing differences between the two countries might be amicably arranged
by the exercise of patience and conciliation”.3 Monson then wrote to Salis-
bury that Delcassé’s moderate tone and very cordial manner inspired
him to believe that Frenchmen will discuss the question again with
calmness.4 Delcassé knew, that France could not go to war, and as
soon as Great Britain pointed out that she is not willing to share the
influence upon Upper Nile Basin with any other European country,
1 J.M. GOUDSWAARD, Some Aspects of the End of Britain’s “Splendid Isolation”, 1898–
1904, Rotterdam 1952, p. 96.
2 C. ANDREW, “France and the Making of the Entente Cordiale”, in: The Historical
Journal, 10, 1, 1967, p. 93.
3 Monson to Salisbury, Paris, September 8, 1898, in: G. P. GOOCH – H.W.V. TEMPER-
LEY (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914. The End of British
Isolation, Vol. 1, London 1927 (hereafter BD 1), Doc. No. 188, p. 163.
4 Ibidem.
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he knew that diplomacy would be the only way out of the precarious
situation.5
When the French expedition of Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand fi-
nally encountered the expedition of Herbert Horatio Kitchener on
September 19, Fashoda became nearly a nightmare for Quai d’Orsay.
Delcassé was afraid that Kitchener’s encounter with Marchand might
end in blows and provoke a European conflict. He tried to reduce the
possible harm by denying existence of Marchand’s mission itself and
pointing out that “Marchand was but a one of the subordinates of Liotard”
whose mission started in 1892/1893, so already two years before Ed-
ward Grey’s speech, by which Great Britain claimed the whole area of
the Upper Nile Basin and stated that any incursion would be consid-
ered an unfriendly act.6
After receiving news of the encounter at Fashoda on September 26
Delcassé realized that Marchand and Kitchener exchanged just formal
protests and drank a bottle of champagne and such information was a
load off his mind. He wrote to his wife: “I can at least congratulate my-
self for having taken the first step a month ago [on September 7] in open-
ing negotiations and having thus perhaps prevented bloodshed.”7 He knew
that the Nile valley was not worth of a large-scale war, but he did not
want to abandon Fashoda without discussion. According to Charles
Porter, he should have told captain Baratier on October 27, 1898: “You
cannot desire a hostility of such a powerful state as England when we are
still bleeding on our eastern frontier.”8 It was no surprise that Delcassé
was hoping to find such a way out of the crisis that would save the
face of France. But regrettably, Great Britain did not offer such a way.
According to Christopher Andrew: “Delcassé firstly wanted to use inter-
pellations on the Fashoda crisis as an opportunity to address the Chamber on
Marchand’s withdrawal, but on November 4 he finally changed his mind and
told the Chamber that the national interest demanded that he stay silent.”9
Delcassé finally agreed to withdraw from Fashoda, but even though
5 J. J. MATHEWS, Egypt and the Formation of the Anglo-French Entente of 1904, London
1939, p. 19; A. J. P. TAYLOR, Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918, Oxford 1954,
p. 381.
6 Monson to Salisbury, Paris, September 19, 1898. BD 1, Doc. No. 192, p. 166.
7 C.M. ANDREW, Théophile Delcassé and the Making of Entente Cordiale. A Reappraisal of
French Foreign Policy 1898–1905, London 1968, p. 92.
8 C.W. PORTER, The Career of Théophile Delcassé, Philadelphia 1936, p. 130.
9 ANDREW, Théophile Delcassé. . . , p. 102.
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the crisis was settled quickly, Fashoda left deep scratches in the face of
the French national pride.10
Throughout the year of 1898 the core of the French parti colonial11
realized that without any French foothold in the Basin of the Upper
Nile not only would they not be able to reopen the Egyptian ques-
tion but neither get support of any other country. Eugènne Étienne
and Paul-Anthelme Bourde12 therefore considered for the first time
the idea of territorial compensation. The birth of the idea of the Anglo-
French barter lies in autumn of 1898, when the Bulletin of the Comité
de l’Afrique Française declared for the first time French “readiness to ac-
cept Egypt as English in return for compensation in Morocco”. However,
Delcassé was not ready to take it as a solid base for the French policy
yet.13
There were three men whose influence upon Théophile Delcassé
was significant. These gentlemenwere Étienne, Bourde and Paul Cam-
bon, who was a close friend of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Pierre
Paul Cambon had a law degree from Oxford, Cambridge and Edin-
burg Universities and he later started his diplomatic career by be-
coming the French minister plenipotentiary at Tunis. A prelude to
the Anglo-French rapprochement was a change at the post of am-
bassador at the Albert Gate House, the seat of the French Embassy
in London. When the Fashoda crisis was culminating, Delcassé sug-
gested to the British Government that Paul Cambon should replace
baron de Courcel in London. By that time, Cambon was already well
known as an Anglophile and according to Monson “he was the best
man that could be [sic] chosen”.14 Delcassé was well aware of Cambon’s
exceptional diplomatic qualities and negotiation skills and therefore
10 P.M.H. BELL, France and Britain, 1900–1940. Entente and Estrangement, 2nd Ed., Lon-
don 2014, pp. 19–20.
11 Delcassé was one of the founders of parti colonial, colonial group which existed in the
French Chamber and whose purpose was to carry the ideas of colonialism through.
For further reference see: C. ANDREW – A. S. KANYA-FORSTNER, “The French
Colonial Party. It’s Composition, Aims and Influence, 1885–1914”, in: The Historical
Journal, 14, 1, 1971, pp. 99–128.
12 Both Étienne and Bourde had large influence upon Théophile Delcassé. Bourde, who
was Delcassé’s close friend, was believed to be his right hand and the soul and the
brain of the whole French colonial movement.
13 ANDREW, “France and the Making of the Entente Cordiale”, p. 91.
14 ANDREW, Théophile Delcassé. . . , p. 113.
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he emphasized that “the French republic is [. . . ] choosing an ambassador
notoriously most friendly and inspired with the best disposition towards Eng-
land”.15 Queen Victoria’s approval came by a letter by Edmund Mon-
son, British Ambassador in Paris, on September 19, 1898 and the path
to the Anglo-French entente could hereby begin.
Shortly after his arrival to London, Cambon reported to Delcassé
about tight atmosphere and hoped he would not become the second
Benedetti.16 His instruction was to dissipate the persistent points at
issue in between of France and Britain.17 In December 1898 Cambon
told his guests at the reception for the French colony that “the inter-
ests of France and England are not incompatible and they ought always to
be in accord with those of civilisation and progress”.18 Monson wrote pri-
vately to lord Salisbury that he did not know why France expected
that Cambon would be able to plunge into the most serious negoti-
ations with the Prime Minister and he was persuaded that such was
the hope of bothQuai d’Orsay and Élysée Palace.19 When it was finally
publicly announced that Fashoda had been evacuated on January 11,
1899, Cambon tried to approach Salisbury and discuss the question
of the area of Bahr al Ghazal, where Fashoda was located. Salisbury
refused any other than commercial outlet to be allowed and Cambon
shortly came back with an idea of demarcation line which Salisbury
admitted to be a possible basis for the settlement. Cambon tried to
bring up the question of Newfoundland fisheries rights, but Salisbury
did not take up the bait and said that the problem has been discussed
for sixty years already and could continue for a long time.20
The negotiations of the fate of Bahr al Ghazal continued through-
out January and February of 1899. The Anglo-French treaty was finally
15 K. EUBANK, Paul Cambon: Master Diplomatist, Westport 1978, p. 62.
16 H. CAMBON (ed.), Paul Cambon, ambassadeur de France (1843–1924) par un diplomate
(hereafter CAMBON), Paris 1937, p. 173.
17 ANDREW, “France and the Making of the Entente Cordiale”, p. 94. According to
W.L. Langer Cambon accepted the post of French Ambassador to London on condi-
tion that efforts will be made in the direction of coming to some general agreement
in between of France and the Great Britain. See W. L. LANGER, The Diplomacy of
Imperialism, 1890–1902, New York 1951, p. 566.
18 EUBANK, p. 65.
19 ANDREW, Théophile Delcassé. . . , p. 113.
20 Delcassé to Cambon, Paris, January 14, 1899, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Paris
(hereafter MAE), Papiers d’agents, Paul Cambon papers (hereafter PA, Cambon), 78,
f. 091.
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signed in London onMarch 21, 1899 and the spheres of influence in the
Congo-Nil watershed were determined as follows: the whole Egyp-
tian Sudan and the part of the Libyan dessert adjacent to the western
part of Egypt passed under the control of Great Britain while France
gained the area betweenDarfur and Lake Chad.21 As soon as the treaty
was signed, Delcassé was persuaded that a settlement of the other mu-
tual colonial disputes will follow shortly.22 Cambon tried to approach
lord Salisbury before the summer of 1899, but the talks on Madagas-
car, Newfoundland, Muscat and Shanghai had failed before any real
negotiations could have started. Salisbury actually believed that noth-
ing more than a status of mutual apathetic tolerance could exist in the
relations of Great Britain and France.23
Due to the Boer War, which burst out during the fall of 1899, the
mutual relationships worsened again. Paul Cambon reported “prevail-
ing Francophobe sentiments of the British society” and his apprehension
that “once British deal with the Transvaal issue, they will have time to look
for a dispute directed against us”.24 In a letter to D’Estournelles de Con-
stant at the end of October 1899 Paul Cambon confessed, that he was
asked from all sides why France did not seek any discord with Eng-
land while she was busy in Transvaal.25 He begged Delcassé to quite
the French press which actually referred to London as to “an eternal
enemy”, while on the other side of the Channel, the British press osten-
tatiously refused to leave the topic of the Dreyfus Affair.26 According
to Christopher Andrew “the mutual hostility of both sides of the Chan-
nel became with the beginning of the Boer War even greater than during a
Fashoda Crisis a year before”.27 In a letter to D’Estournelles de Constant,
Paul Cambon confessed: “There is an abyss in between of what the English
say and what they really do, in between of what they believe in and what the
reality is. It is necessary not only to be aware of this but to act accordingly.”28
21 EUBANK, p. 66.
22 ANDREW, “France and the Making of the Entente Cordiale”, p. 94.
23 Ibidem.
24 Cambon to Delcassé, London, November 11, 1899. Documents diplomatiques
français (hereafter DDF), 1st series, Vol. XV, Paris 1959, Doc. No. 297, p. 514.
25 CAMBON, p. 30.
26 MATHEWS, p. 16; P. GUILLEN, “The Entente of 1904 as a Colonial Settlement”, in:
P. GIFFORD – W.R. LOUIS (eds.), France and Britain in Africa. Imperial Rivalry and
Colonial Rule, London 1971, p. 334.
27 ANDREW, “France and the Making of the Entente Cordiale”, p. 94.
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The situation at the close of 1899 was according to Daily Mail such
as follows: “The French successfully persuaded John Bull about being his
eternal enemies [. . . ]. Nothing like Entente Cordiale could exist between
Great Britain and her nearest neighbour.”29 Even Cambon expressed his
worries in a letter to his mother on November 28, 1899: “Delcassé’s dis-
course will luckily bring ‘une détente’ because we have been marching to the
war” and later on December 10 he expressed his disillusionment about
the atmosphere in the French Chamber: “I am terrified by foolishness of
our deputies. It’s been 8 days since Delcassé gave a speech for which he re-
ceived much praise and ovation. Etienne said the exact opposite but ended
with the same ovation and praise. Lockroy declares that a war with England
is inevitable.”30
Paul Cambon wrote to Delcassé on December 12, 1899 that accord-
ing to some indications he received from several sources Foreign Of-
fice would appreciate to come to more relaxed relations with France,
and such was the British public opinion, even though the indications
were still vague. Cambon was persuaded that British, who suffered
succession of failures in South Africa, would appreciate the return of
the French sympathies.31 However, the question remains whether the
wish was not the father to the thought.
Another affair which brought mutual relations to a boiling point
was the one of French caricaturist Lucien Léandre who offended
Queen Victoria by displaying British Secretary of State for the Colonies
Chamberlain hiding behind her skirts. The Queen has seen the cari-
catures personally and the fact that Léandre was decorated with the
Legion of Honour by the Minister of Fine Arts was taken by her as
an insult. She even privately urged that British Ambassador Monson
should be recalled from Paris. Monson left the French metropolis, and
he moved less ostentatiously to Cannes. There was a large campaign
in the French press making fun of the Queen and criticizing the cur-
rent French Government.32 French journal Gaulois referred to this in-
28 P. CAMBON, Correspondance 1870–1924, Tome II, Paris 1940, p. 29.
29 G. MARTINEAU, L’ Entente Cordiale, Paris 1984, p. 78.
30 CAMBON, Correspondance 1870–1924, p. 31.
31 Cambon to Delcassé, December 12, 1899. MAE, Nouvelle série (1896–1918, hereafter
NS), Grande Bretagne, 12, f. 121.
32 Ibidem.
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cident as to a “revenge for Fashoda”33 while Écho de Paris ribbed Sir
Edmund Monson for taking a French leave and criticized Théophile
Delcassé for being a boot licker of the British Government.34 La Pa-
trie described Delcassé in the same way, as a person who has no equal
concerning apologizing to British and demeaning French diplomacy.35
On 21 March 1900 Cambon informed Delcassé about the campaign
the British press pursued against Germany and he expressed his hopes
that such a campaign would lead to persuasion that any conflict be-
tween France and Great Britain would help no one but the interests
of Germany.36 Just one day later he wrote to his brother Jules, French
Ambassador to Madrid at that time, that he met Lord Salisbury the
day before and he was sure that détente was coming but we should
not be too optimistic in France, because the impression caused by the
Léandre affair was not dispelled yet.37 The same dayDelcassé received
a letter by Edmund Monson in which he thanked him for punishing
the offenders and for suggesting the Minister of Public Instruction
(the same gentleman who decorated caricaturist Léandre) the incon-
venient results which may arise from the delivery of lectures at this
moment upon South African questions.38 The change in the English
public opinion and the relief in the Anglo-French relations were finally
perceptible. According to Paul Cambon, such a change in the English
public opinion was caused by three principal causes: (1) Britain was
exhausted by the ongoing Boer war which was very expensive and
could not see any profit in the possibility of running a new conflict; (2)
the British politicians realized that any conflict between London and
Paris would help only to the interests of Germany; and (3) the French
decided to effect a defensive and fortification works in their ports and
colonies.39
Themutual rapprochement was supported at the end of March dur-
ing the banquet organized in London by municipal corporations. The
mayors of the important cities were invited to attend this event as well
33 Le Gaulois, February 17, 1900. MAE, NS, Grande Bretagne 12, f. 147.
34 L’ Écho de Paris, February 6, 1900. MAE, NS, Grande Bretagne 12, f. 143.
35 La Patrie, February 6, 1900. MAE, NS, Grande Bretagne 12, f. 142.
36 Cambon to Delcassé, March 21, 1900. MAE, NS, Grande Bretagne 12, f. 217.
37 CAMBON, Correspondance 1870–1924, p. 41.
38 Monson to Delcassé, March 22, 1900. MAE, NS, Grande Bretagne 12, f. 220.
39 Cambon to Delcassé, April 5, 1900. MAE, NS, Grande Bretagne 12, ff. 241–245.
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as number of politicians and some members of British Government.
Baron Estournelles de Constant attended the event too and he used
this opportunity to give a speech on the Anglo-French relations, for
which he received an applause and praise. He stated that there can
never be complete peace between two nations whose interests are col-
liding in so many parts of the world, but he insisted on the necessity
of living in harmony without any hostilities.40
In themeantime Delcassé had changed his priorities – he postponed
his hopes for understanding with Great Britain in near future and he
decided to pursue another matter instead. He believed that British en-
gagement in South Africa would allow France to resolve the questions
of Egypt and Morocco. But instead of settling those questions jointly
and by agreement with London, he decided to take them apart and
solve them without the prior agreement of London.41 Delcassé’s plan
was to divide Morocco between France and Spain and not earlier than
in 1903 he was ready to modify this plan and to offer British any-
thing more but commercial freedom and neutralisation of the Strait
of Gibraltar.42
By March 1900 Delcassé realized that he will not be able to end the
British occupation in Egypt and this moment was crucial for the ori-
gins of the Entente Cordiale since there was an essential step towards
Delcassé’s eventual conversion to the idea of Morocco-Egypt barter.43
Since 1899, Cambon had given the French foreign minister pieces of
advice and exact recommendations, particularly on the subject of the
Moroccan question and of Anglo-French relations. In the previously
mentioned subjects they usually had opposite opinions. In the Moroc-
can question Delcassé adhered, according to Cambon, too much upon
the status quo. Therefore the French ambassador to London persuaded
him that it was necessary to open the debate with England on that
subject.44
British were in a difficult position at the turn of the century. The
Boer war produced diplomatic weakness and they had to face French
in Morocco and Russians in Persia and Afghanistan. Great Britain had
40 Ibidem.
41 ANDREW, “France and the Making of the Entente Cordiale”, p. 95.
42 Ibidem, p. 99.
43 Ibidem.
44 C. GEOFFROY, Les Coulisses de l’Entente Cordiale, Paris 2004, pp. 236–237.
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never before been confrontedwith such intensive competition in every
part of the world.45 This war together with other circumstances led the
British to the idea that the time has come to leave the policy of splen-
did isolation. In November 1900 the change of the balance of forces in
the British Cabinet allowed pro-German section to open the way for
an experiment in foreign policy. Lord Lansdowne, new Foreign Secre-
tary, was involved in the negotiations with Germany throughout the
1901, but the attempt to conclude any Anglo-German alliance failed.46
Paul Cambon, apart from Delcassé, decided that the time has come
to raise the interest of the British Government for the settlement of
Moroccan question and he tried to pursue this in March 1901 on his
own. Cambon called upon Lord Lansdowne, who replaced Lord Salis-
bury as the British Foreign Secretary, and he tried to get him involved
in the idea of exchanging French position in Morocco in return for
French claims in New Foundland.47 Edmund Monson was surprised
by Cambon’s proposal: “Cambon has reputation of being keenly ambitious,
but his suggestion of obtaining compensations on the Moroccan frontier for a
French abandonment of Treaty Rights in Newfoundland seems to my limited
intelligence [. . . ] and unpractical so much so that I cannot but think that so
clever a man as he is could only have been thinking of eliciting an expres-
sion of opinion as to the length, to which his country may go in that region
without hindrance or protest of England.”48
While Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Colonies, waswill-
ing to discuss the issue further, Lansdowne was not ready to consider
that matter yet. Regarding Morocco, Chamberlain reminded Lans-
downe: “[I]f we are to discuss such a large question as Morocco, please bear
in mind that the Germans will have something to say – and both they and
we will want compensation.”49 Cambon approached Lansdowne again
45 G. MONGER, The End of Isolation. British Foreign Policy 1900–1907, London 1963, p.
13.
46 For further details see A. LAJEUNESSE, “The Anglo-German Alliance Talks and the
Failure of Amateur Diplomacy”, in: Past Imperfect, 13, 2007, pp. 84–107.
47 ANDREW, Théophile Delcassé. . . , p. 206; Monson to Lansdowne, March 22, 1901. The
National Archives, London, Kew (hereafter TNA), FO 800/125, f. 83. According to
GeorgeMonger, Cambon proposed to Lansdowne on 6March 1901, that New Found-
land fishery privileges could be surrendered in exchange for a territory in the Gam-
bia. See MONGER, p. 39.
48 Monson to Lansdowne, March 22, 1901. TNA, FO 800/125, f. 83.
49 MONGER, p. 39.
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in June 1901 and during the conversation he mentioned that “the com-
pensation for the loss of Treaty Shore Rights in Newfoundland being possi-
bly to be sought for in the granting of a free hand to France in the dealing
with Morocco”.50 Lansdowne was actually convinced of the necessity
of keeping status quo in the Moroccan question and he was not ready
to change his mind about this issue, at least not till the end of 1903.
Morocco was of a strategic importance to Great Britain because of
the Strait of Gibraltar and because of the trade, as she controlled more
than 50 per cent of Moroccan trade. The sultanate dominated the west-
ern portion of the Mediterranean Sea. The French, who were in pos-
session of neighbouring Algeria, occupied oasis Tuat in 1899 and then
since 1902 tried to penetrate to Mauritania. The frontier between
French Algiers and Morocco stayed undefined.51 Young sultan Abde-
laziz invited many European counsellors in order to modernize the
country and such a request represented an ideal opportunity for Great
Britain that waswilling to increase its influence in the country.52 There-
fore many British financial and technical experts were heading to-
wardsMorocco. Among them, HarryMaclean, known as kaid, military
instructor and former non-commissioned officer in the British army,
who worked his way up to become Sultan’s private advisor. Another
important Englishman was Sir Arthur Nicolson, British Minister at
Tangiers who pressed for firm action against the French. He reported
that “Sultan had decided upon an extensive scheme of reforms and had asked
for a British loan to carry them out”.53 He believed that Britain must ei-
ther get the reforms through or she must be ready to give up Morocco
in favour of France and therefore pressed for cooperation with Ger-
many in order to support Sultan.
On June 22, 1901MoroccanMinister ofWar, Menebhi, whowas well
known to be an ardent Anglophile, arrived to London accompanied
by Nicolson.54 The British were careful not to make any promises and
50 Monson to Lansdowne, June 28, 1901. TNA, FO 800/125, f. 101.
51 E. GOMBÁR,Moderní deˇjiny islámských zemí, Praha 1999, p. 351.
52 Nicolson to Lansdowne, April 1, 1901. TNA, FO 800/135, ff. 13–14.
53 MONGER, p. 40.
54 Originally, Sultan himself wanted to visit London in person, but Lansdowne dis-
missed this idea as such a visit would not be opportune and suggested that a visit of
the Minister of War would be less objectionable. Lansdowne to Nicolson, March 20,
1901. TNA, FO 800/135, f. 8.
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Moroccan envoy departed to Berlin “virtually empty handed”.55 During
his visit in Berlin, the German Minister at Tangiers Mentzingen criti-
cized French plans in Morocco and declared that “the Kaiser was even
ready to go to war to thwart them”.56 Lansdowne was persuaded that
reports on the French activity in Morocco were exaggerated and after
Cambon’s assurances the British did not want to believe that France
was considering any forward action in Morocco.57 When a serious cri-
sis burst out at the end of July 1901, Lansdowne could see that since he
would not come to terms with France, his only possibility was to turn
to Germany. However, Morocco was a question of far greater impor-
tance to Britain than to Germany, and therefore Lansdowne was lucky
than no further crisis flamed up until the end of 1902.58
Throughout 1901 Cambon tried to broach other points at issue as
well. In July 1901 he renewed his proposal for renouncement of the
French Shore fishery rights in Newfoundland in return for compen-
sation elsewhere and Lansdowne referred to Chamberlain as follows:
“I don’t see why a settlement should be unattainable – I wish they would
ask for a bit of hinterland somewhere or other.”59 On 31 March 1901 Lans-
downe opened a discussion, which finally ended at a deadlock due
to Cambon’s ostentatious claim for Gambia territory compensation.
Lansdowne rejected that on the ground that “it would give rise to fur-
ther demands on each side for concessions and counter concessions, demands
which, in my opinion, would probably destroy all hopes of an arrangement”,
but he offered that he would be ready to discuss a compensation else-
where but Gambia. Cambon did not take up the bait and because
Lansdowne remained silent, the negotiations ended.60
In Siam the British and French were at odds because of the spheres
of influence. By the end of 1901, London received alarming reports
that other Powers might be trying to penetrate into the Malay States
while using the Siamese suzerainty. The Colonial Office was pressing
55 Sultan planned that his emissary would visit London, Paris, Berlin and St. Peters-
burg, but French agent informed him that neither Paris nor St. Petersburg would
accept a mission which previously went to London and Berlin. Nicolson to Lans-
downe, TNA, FO 800/135, f. 27.
56 MONGER, p. 41.
57 Ibidem, p. 42.
58 Ibidem.
59 Ibidem, p. 44.
60 Ibidem.
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the Foreign Office hard to assert British rights there. In October Lans-
downe expressed his worries about Germany possibly interfering in
Siamese affairs: “Her interests are different from ours and she has a habit of
securing her pound of flesh whenever she confers or makes belief to confer a
favour. In this case I should be afraid of her cutting the pound of our joint.
She has lately been hoping to squeeze out British employees of the Siamese
Government and she is sure to seek privileges or preferences of some sort at
our expense.”61
Lansdowne preferred to negotiate with Siam directly instead of try-
ing to come to terms with France, but the negotiations with Siamese
ended at a deadlock by July. Later in August he realized that he would
need to find other way instead of relying on Siamese only. Germans
were interested in a coaling station and Russia was possibly interested
in the area too. Lansdowne therefore proposed that a decisive unilat-
eral action should be taken in order to defend British interests in the
Malay Peninsula. Chamberlain had presented the idea to lord Balfour
and new Prime Minister “agreed that French influence in Mekong can do
us no harm”.62
The year of 1902 brought a decisive change into Franco-British re-
lations. By that time Paul Cambon argued that the solution to the
Franco-British disputes laid in the Moroccan-Egyptian exchange,
which would address a reciprocal recognition of interests and swap-
ping of rights and advantages they enjoyed in those countries. At the
beginning of 1902, Lord Lansdowne wrote to Monson: “The attitude of
the French Government towards theMorocco question appears to have under-
gone a remarkable change.”63 When Cambon met Lansdowne after lord
Salisbury’s retirement in July 1902, French diplomat suggested pos-
sible settlement of Moroccan issue – he proposed that Britain could
secure the neutralisation of Tangiers in return for unspecified conces-
sions in the hinterland to be done in favour of France. Cambon stated:
“Our interest in Morocco is Tangiers. Europe cannot let us establish there
and we cannot let any Power to do the same. Why don’t we neutralize Tang-
iers?”64 Later on he went further and on July 30 he added that France
61 Lansdowne to Monson, October 13, 1901. TNA, FO 800/125, f. 113.
62 MONGER, p. 78.
63 Lansdowne to Monson, January 2, 1902. TNA, FO 800/125, f. 125.
64 Cambon to Delcassé, July 23, 1902. MAE, PA, Cambon, 78, ff. 111–112.
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and Britain could come to terms in Siam too.65 Lansdowne assured
Cambon he was aware of special interests of France in the area along
the Moroccan-Algerian frontier, where political unrest occurred.66 The
British were “persistently discouraging Sultan from any extravagant enter-
prises as well as from any action calculated to embroil him with his French
neighbours”.67
Because of the reports of Saint-René Taillandier, new French Min-
ister in Tangiers, Cambon was very concerned about the activities of
British in Morocco, particularly about Maclean, who constituted a bat-
talion of Personal Guard, well equipped and well trained. The British
secured a monopoly to supply all military equipment including
guns.68 Furthermore, the Sultan was considering a loan and he was
pressing British, that if they refuse to help him hewould turn to France
or to Germany. Sultan was considering conceding the telegraph mo-
nopoly to British, which aroused temper in France too.69 Another
source of anxiety was restless Moroccan tribes. Cambon was aware
that Moroccan sultan was weak and this made him feel uneasy about
the future.70 He was equally depressed about the French attitude to
the Moroccan question and for that reason he wrote to Delcassé on
July 23, 1902: “For God’s sake, let’s stop complaining and start acting a lit-
tle bit rationally.”71
On August 6, 1902 Paul Cambon and Lord Lansdowne met and
had another long and important conversation. French Ambassador
had met Delcassé and he was authorized to present definite propos-
als. He emphasized that France was not dreaming about new acqui-
sitions with regards to her colonial dominion and that “all that France
desired was to ensure the security of what she already possessed”.72 Accord-
ing to Delcassé there were only two points where French position was
insecure, Siam and Morocco. In Siam, French and British had signed
an agreement in 1896 under which each of them had recognized that
65 MONGER, p. 77.
66 EUBANK, p. 73.
67 Lansdowne to Monson, January 2, 1902. TNA, FO 800/125, f. 125.
68 Cambon to Delcassé, July 23, 1902. MAE, PA, Cambon, 78, f. 113.
69 Cambon to Delcassé, January 13, 1902. MAE, PA, Cambon, 78, f. 103.
70 EUBANK, p. 74.
71 Cambon to Delcassé, July 23, 1902. MAE, PA, Cambon, 78, f. 113.
72 Lansdowne to Monson, August 6, 1902. TNA, FO 800/125, Doc. No. 316A, f. 198.
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the other possessed a sphere of influence in the Siamese territory. Con-
cerningMorocco, the Frenchwereworried about “too energetic [British]
officers, who might, by the advice which they gave to Sultan, encourage him
to adopt a policy which might drive him in conflict with France”.73 Most
importantly, Cambon presented Delcassé’s concerns that “the two Gov-
ernments should frankly discuss the action which they might need to take in
the event of Morocco’s passing into liquidation”. He admitted that Spain
would have to be reckoned with. Regarding Tangiers, Delcassé sug-
gested that the best solution would be to make it an open and interna-
tional port.74
Lansdowne was reluctant to any premature liquidation of Morocco,
as he feared a possibility of further complications and international
crisis, because at least Germany, Italy and Spain were having their in-
terests there too. Nevertheless, he promised to consider the proposal
and to consult the cabinet, which was on eve of the parliamentary va-
cation, and because of that he might not be able to say anything more
on the subject for a few weeks.75
Few weeks later, the Moroccan Minister of War informed German
vice-consul in Fez about negotiations being in progress between Lon-
don and Paris and he referred that these negotiations might give
French the free hand in Morocco. Walter Harris from London Times
had informed the vice-consul that he was the source of the informa-
tion and a roundabout of pumping about the talks begun. Austrian
chargé d’affaires in Paris was inquiring Monson about details and von
Eckhardstein was inquiring Lansdowne in London and he finally got
a statement that the French had made some propositions.76
Cambon made another attempt to discuss the matter on October 15,
1902 when he repeated what he said in August already, suggesting
that Spain should get a stretch of the coast and some hinterland, leav-
ing France to exercise exclusive influence in the rest of the country. He
kept turning back to German failure to establish them in Morocco and
he emphasized that Italy was now without an interest in the area.77
73 Ibidem, f. 199.
74 Ibidem.
75 Ibidem.
76 EUBANK, p. 76.
77 MONGER, p. 77; MATHEWS, p. 46. Delcassé was able to manage the Italians quite
easily. He aimed to break up the coalition between Italy and the Triple Alliance, and
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However, Lansdowne did not have any motive to discard his idea
of ignoring the Moroccan question as far as possible and he rejected
Cambon when stating that they were not prepared to discuss a pos-
sible “liquidation of Morocco”. Lansdowne then wrote to Monson: “We
have no wish to anglicize the Sultan’s army and use it then in favour of our
interests. I wish we could persuade M. Delcassé of an absolute sincerity and
disinterestedness.”78 The Moroccan question was mothballed then.79
Twomonths later, Cambon approached Lansdowne again broached
the Moroccan problem on the ground of omitting formal treaty and
discussing the present situation and possible future development. He
emphasized the need for being prepared for unexpected events in the
future. Another meeting took place on December 31, 1902 and Cam-
bon did his best to avoid speaking about “liquidation”which probably
frightened Lansdowne before. He assured Lansdowne that France de-
sired the status quo even if the ongoing insurrections should lead to
the overthrow of Sultan Abdelaziz. He equally mentioned that there
was a danger that German Emperor might intervene in case of revolts
in Morocco.80
When Lansdowne repeatedly refused to come to terms onMoroccan
issue, Cambon tried to reopen talks with Spain, whose interests were
advocated in Paris by Ambassador Léon y Castillo. During September,
October andNovember, the Spanish Liberal Government opposed any
agreement which concernedMorocco and the situation did not change
even despite the arrival of a Spanish conservative cabinet in Decem-
ber 1902. This cabinet declined any signature of such an agreement
without previous notification of the British Government.81
In the second half of 1902 Great Britain had to face Russians in the
Central Asia (Persia and Afghanistan), they challenged the question
for this purpose he made use of the Italian economic crisis. This policy bore fruit in
1900 and in 1901 when France successfully ruptured the Triple Alliance by signing a
pact with Italy. In November 1902 Italy finally signed an agreement with France by
which she promised neutrality in the event that France would face the aggression of
one or several powers, or in case France would have to take the initiative because of
direct provocation. That was Delcassé’s masterpiece.
78 Lansdowne to Monson, December 28, 1902. TNA, FO 800/125, ff. 208–209.
79 EUBANK, p. 82.
80 J.M. GOUDSWAARD, Some Aspects of the End of Britain’s “Splendid Isolation”, 1898–
1904, Rotterdam 1952, p. 101.
81 GEOFFROY, p. 240.
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of the neutrality of Straits once again in September 1902 and then in
January 1903. In August 1902 Arnold Foster visited Kiel and reported
about the German naval establishments, emphasizing that Germany
should be now regarded as possible enemy. Germans were a source
of anxiety for British in the area of Yangtze and Shanghai in China
too. By the beginning of 1903 the ground for possible Anglo-French
entente was getting ready. Chamberlain was advocating the entente
with France not only as a settlement of colonial differences but he de-
sired it to be an arrangement for general diplomatic cooperation as
well. According to George Monger, Balfour and Lansdowne were still
more inclined to seek some kind of arrangement with Russians; it was
mainly because of British precarious position in Central Asia. In De-
cember 1902 France was the only European Power with whom British
had friendly relations. Furthermore, she was an ally of Russia.82
When Moroccan insurrections burst out at the end of December
1902, Lansdowne could not ignore the problem anymore.83 He was
perturbed by the latest news from North Africa which revealed that
sultan had sustained a serious revolt and he was afraid that the French
might take advantage of such a course of events and renew the over-
tures.84 Monson referred then: “He [Delcassé] was undoubtedly excited
and anxious about the situation in Morocco, and I cannot too much empha-
size his insistence of the expediency of not sending ships of war to the coast
and thus risking the further exasperation of the fanatical element against the
Europeans in the country.”85
Spanish Ambassador then arrived to Paris andwhen he called upon
Delcassé he was so upset that he was speaking so loud that all the
ambassadors in the meeting room could hear him. He should have
told Delcassé that “Moors were a formidable race of warriors and it would
take an army of four thousand men to reduce them”. Monson believed that
his Spanish colleague was rather given to exuberance of language and
he added that “I fear that very probable catastrophe which seems to await
the sultan will not cause either this Government or public opinion in France
82 MONGER, p. 108.
83 For further details about the insurrections see: Gaillard to Saint-René Taillandier, Jan-
uary 12, 1902. France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Documents Diplomatiques,
Affaires du Maroc, 1901–1905, Paris, 1905, Doc. No. 41, Anexe, pp. 55–56.
84 Lansdowne to Monson, December 28, 1902. TNA, FO 800/125, ff. 208–209.
85 Monson to Lansdowne, December 31, 1902. Ibidem, f. 211.
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any regret. He [sultan] is generally considered more or less a puppet in the
hands of British advisers and his disappearance would be tailed as ‘a check to
our intrigues’”.
According to Monson all what Delcassé desired was that the Mo-
roccan struggle would be decided promptly and effectively on spot.86
British Ambassador went further when stating that: “When one sees
what fanatics these Moors are, many years must elapse before the French will
be able to round off their African dominions by the acquisition of the North-
west corner of the continent. [. . . ] I cannot imagine that anyone, except so
sanguine and enterprising an annexationist as Cambon, would care to stir
up such a hornet’s nest in cold blood.”87 During this crisis Monson re-
peatedly warned Lansdowne not to believe Delcassé: “I have found it
impossible to take him at his word, and have been compelled to acquiesce that
he is not only a liar, but a clumsy liar also.”88
The situation in Morocco worsened again and therefore at the be-
ginning of February 1903 even Paul Révoil, the French Governor Gen-
eral of Algeria, alarmed Delcassé when stating that he considered it
dangerous for the safety of the people and for good relations with
Morocco to ignore the current insurrections at the western part of the
region and continuing the passive attitude.89
Five British ships were hastily sent to Gibraltar to protect British res-
idents in Morocco and Lansdowne had to make a decision with whom
to cooperate with. He finally decided to go the way of least resistance
and therefore he opted for France. According to George Monger, such
a decision was a response to the needs of moment rather than any new
general diplomatic course. At least Lansdowne and Balfour perceived
it as temporary arrangement.90
At the beginning of 1903 France and Britain came to agreement over
one part of theMoroccan question. At that time, a private joint loan for
the Sultan ofMorocco was discussed in the banks in Paris, Madrid and
London. In February the British revealed that the French were trying
86 Monson to Lansdowne, December 31, 1902. Ibidem, f. 212.
87 Monson to Lansdowne, January 9, 1903. Ibidem, f. 229.
88 Monson to Lansdowne, November 28, 1902. Ibidem, f. 204.
89 Révoil to Delcassé, February 9, 1903. France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Do-
cuments Diplomatiques, Affaires du Maroc, 1901–1905, Paris, 1905, Doc. No. 44, pp.
57–58.
90 MONGER, p. 113.
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to keep the loan entirely in their hands and therefore the British had
to intensify their pressure.91 The loan was finally contracted in April
1903 as three separate loans of the same size and on the same terms.
The Moroccan question was then left alone until summer.92
The time has come to prepare the grounds for future Anglo-French
rapprochement and eventual agreement, therefore all newspapers,
magazines and British and French chambers of commerce did their
best to get the public opinion in favour of the mutual friendship. The
Times of March 5, 1903 reported: “The French Ambassador said he consid-
ered it his first duty to work for the development of good relations between the
two countries [. . . ]. France and England had no serious reason for disagree-
ment!”93 Cambon then suggested that The Association of Chambers of
Commerce should be established.
New impetus for improvement of mutual relations came with the
planned visit of the King to Paris. On March 11 Monson received a
confidential letter from Lord Lansdowne stating that the King is think-
ing about taking a cruise on the Portuguese, Spanish and Italian coasts
and that he would be pleased to meet the French president Loubet on
the French soil, either in Cannes in the middle of April or at the end of
April in Paris.94 Due to the planned visit of Loubet to Algeria and Tu-
nis with the planned return to Paris on May 1, 1903, the King decided
to postpone his return and to appear in Paris on May 2.95 The visit
by Edward VII to Paris brought about a considerable change into the
mutual relations of both countries. The English monarch was given a
warm reception upon his arrival and he repeatedly emphasized that
“the enmity was no longer an issue”.96
The king’s visit to Paris provoked Berlin, where German newspa-
pers commented on Edward’s stay in the metropolis upon Seine sar-
donically. While one part of Germany was afraid that the king’s visit
to Paris would give birth to the anti-German alliance of France, Russia
91 Ibidem.
92 Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, April 2, 1903. France, Ministère des Affaires
Étrangères, Documents Diplomatiques, Affaires du Maroc, 1901–1905, Paris, 1905,
Doc. No. 56, p. 65.
93 The Times, March 5, 1903. TNA, FO 800/125, f. 242; EUBANK, p. 80.
94 Lansdowne to Monson, March 11, 1903. TNA, FO 800/125, ff. 246–248.
95 Lansdowne to Monson, March 13, 1903. Ibidem, ff. 257–258.
96 MATHEWS, p. 43.
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and Great Britain, the second part thought that the journey of Edward
VII could be an overture for the alliance of France, Great Britain and
Italy.97 Germany watched that visit with animosity not only because
of fear of a possible alliance, but also because “the Emperor’s uncle had
not visited Berlin officially yet since the coronation of Wilhelm II”.98 Ger-
man Ambassador at London Paul Metternich later wrote to German
chancellery Bülow that rapprochement between France and England
is a product of “the general dislike of Germany”.99 In contrast the royal
visit in Paris was well received in Saint Petersburg where such a visit
was perceived as a slap in the face of German Emperor.100
While relations with France were gradually improving, Britain had
to face other problems and the most acute one among them was the
Far Eastern Crisis. When British had concluded their alliance treaty
with Japan in 1902, they hoped that such an agreement would ease
their burden and they would not need keeping a strong force in Far
Eastern waters anymore. In April 1903 the crisis burst out entirely and
Hayashi announced that “Japan could no longer pursue a policy of for-
bearance and would approach Russia for a direct settlement of the differences
between the two countries in Manchuria and Korea”.101 He invited Britain
under the terms of alliance, to suggest the steps to be taken in de-
fence of their threatened interests. British Government was in an un-
easy and unenviable position. And a possible way out of the walk on
the tightrope was a close entente with France.102
At the end of May, Paris publicly announced the planned visit of
French President Loubet to Great Britain. Before the visit took place,
Eugene Étienne travelled to London to call upon Lansdowne. During
their interview, Étienne “dwelt in particular on the necessity of coming
to terms with regards to Morocco”.103 The visit was probably Delcassé’s
97 Prinet to Delcassé, Berlin, April 26, 1903. In: DDF, Série II, Tome III, Paris 1931, Doc.
No. 201, p. 277.
98 Ibidem.
99 MATHEWS, pp. 49–50.
100 Bompard to Delcassé, May 21, 1903. France, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, Do-
cuments Diplomatiques Français, Série II, Tome III, Paris 1931, Doc. No. 255, p. 343;
P. J. V. ROLO, Entente Cordiale. The Origins and Negotiations of the Anglo-French Agree-
ments of 8 April 1904, London 1969, p. 167.
101MONGER, p. 127.
102 Ibidem.
103 Lansdowne to Monson, July 2, 1903. TNA, FO 633/17, Doc. No. 325, p. 1.
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idea, because he could unofficially find out Lansdowne’s views prior
to any commitment would be made by the French Government.104
Few days after, the official state visit of President Loubet took place.
He spent in London 3 days from July 6 until July 9, 1903 and during
his stay he was accompanied by Théophile Delcassé. Cambon, who
was in charge of the final preparations of the state visit, pressed upon
Delcassé, that “the entire trip would be of little value if the two ministers of
foreign affairs would not meet in order to exchange the views”. Therefore at
a very last moment such a private meeting was arranged at Cambon’s
request and Delcassé called on Lansdowne in the morning of July 7,
1903.105 Lansdowne stated that even though the previous negotiations
with Cambon did not bring any definite results, they helped them to
understand that the points at issue between France and Britain were
few in number and by no means incapable of adjustment.
Lansdowne then broached the questions of Newfoundland. In the
previous discussions with Paul Cambon the French had proposed
withdrawal from the French Shore on condition of receiving suffi-
cient compensation, both territorial and monetary. He had suggested
then that the subject of territorial compensation could be Gambia and
Lansdowne had refused such a solution.106 After seeing Lansdowne’s
somewhat reluctant attitude, Delcassé changed the subject and point-
ed out that the possibility of coming to an understanding as to the
Newfoundland question will entirely depend upon the British atti-
tude with regard to French interests in Morocco.107 Regarding Mo-
rocco, Lansdowne required a guarantee that British trade and enter-
prise will not be placed at any disadvantage, neutrality of Straits and
of the sea-board and finally, proper regards to be shown to Spanish in-
terests. Delcassé said French would not have objections to any of these
three points.108
Lansdowne then broached the question of Siam and New Hebrides
where bothmen came to an understanding. Themost important points
104MATHEWS, p. 66.
105 Lansdowne to Monson, July 7, 1903. TNA, FO 633/17, Doc. No. 336, p. 3; EUBANK,
p. 82.
106 Lansdowne to Monson, July 7, 1903. TNA, FO 633/17, Doc. No. 1, p. 3.
107 Ibidem.
108 Ibidem, p. 4.
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at issue, Morocco and Egypt, were not discussed in detail.109 Delcassé
only stated that “the Egyptian question formed part of the larger African
question which could, he felt sure, be disposed of satisfactorily if the both
countries could come to an agreement as to the position of France and Mo-
rocco”.110 Delcassé did not go to any details with regard to the idea
of general and comprehensive settlement, but the way to an entente
was initiated. Shortly after the end of the state visit the Prime Min-
ister Balfour informed Edward VII that British Government decided
unanimously to continue Anglo-French negotiations.111
The British General Consul of Egypt, lord Cromer, encouraged
Lansdowne to take an advantage of the opportunity made by French
for settling the various outstanding questions. He summarized the is-
sues as follows: “In Morocco, Siam and Sokoto the French want various
things which we have it in our power to give; in Newfoundland and Egypt
the situation is reversed. In these latter cases we depend to a greater extent
on the good will of France. The New Hebrides question [. . . ] does not fall
into one or other of these two groups.”112 Cromer then emphasized that
his own opinion is in favour of making concessions in Morocco, in
return for counter-concessions in Egypt and elsewhere. He acknowl-
edged: “Morocco will, to all intents and purposes, become before long a
French province.”113 In Egypt, Cromer wanted to get rid of the Caisse
de la Dette and he wanted to realize the conversion of the Egyptian
Debt and he expected the French objections. Cromer suggested not
entering into any discussion on the Egyptian question yet, because it
will require very careful consideration. He finally ended his letter to
Lansdowne while stating that “I should be inclined [. . . ] to negotiate on
the basis of an explicit, or in any case implicit, recognition by the French
that Egypt falls within our sphere of influence, as Morocco would fall within
theirs”.114
Later in July, Paul Cambon took over the task to continue the nego-
tiations with Lord Lansdowne and presented the views of Delcassé on
questions they had discussed before. The only question which was not
109 GEOFFROY, pp. 248–249.
110 Lansdowne to Monson, July 7, 1903. TNA, FO 633/17, Doc. No. 1, p. 3.
111Monson to Lansdowne, July 24, 1903. TNA, FO 800/126, f. 17; ANDREW, p. 211.
112 Cromer to Lansdowne, July 17, 1903. TNA, FO 633/6, f. 174, p. 347.
113 Ibidem.
114 Ibidem, p. 349.
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mentioned was the Egyptian one and Lansdowne immediately paid
attention to it. According to Delcassé Egypt, like Morocco, formed
part of the “African question” and if British and French would come
to terms as to Morocco, there would probably be no great difficulty in
coming to terms as to Egypt too. Cambon suggested leaving the Egyp-
tian problem alone for the present and firstly settling the other points
at issue, but Lansdowne refused to do so. Cambon then emphasized
that France would only give up her rights in Egypt for equivalent con-
cessions in Morocco.115
Both diplomats met again on August 5 and discussed the details.
Lansdowne consulted lord Cromer again and the General Consul of
Egypt presented a memorandum where he made many suggestions
particularly regarding obtaining asmuch freedom of action as possible
in the administration of Egypt. Lansdowne then adopted this memo-
randum and used it as a basis for his letter to Paul Cambon.116
The French suggestion about the settlement of Moroccan problem
caused uproar in Britain. The Colonial Office andWar Office were con-
sulted and particularly the latter one was against Lansdowne’s plan to
leave the future fate of Morocco in the hands of France and Spain. Ac-
cording to memorandum of July 31, 1903 War Office argued that “as
the concessions which France asks for in Morocco will be to our disadvantage
and may carry with it serious consequences, it should not be granted unless
we receive a very substantial quid pro quo in other parts of the world”.117 An-
other opponent of the French suggestions was Prince Louis of Batten-
berg, the Director of Naval Intelligence, who argued that leaving the
fate of Morocco in the French and Spanish hands, especially in a situ-
ation when France had recently been working towards Latin League
and trying to ally with Spain and Italy, would be foolishness. He was
convinced that “no more formidable coalition could be brought against us in
the Mediterranean”.118 He therefore concluded that “our possible accep-
tance of these French proposals must depend in the main on how far it would
be practicable to effectually prevent France from using the Moroccan coast as
her own in time of war, and further, we must consider how far any advantages
115 Lansdowne to Monson, July 29, 1903. TNA, FO 633/17, Doc. No. 4, p. 8.
116Memorandum by the Earl of Cromer. TNA, FO 633/17, Doc. No. 6, pp. 11–13.
117MONGER, p. 130.
118Memorandum by August Battenberg, August 7, 1903. TNA, PRO, FO 800/126, ff.
32–33.
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we may gain elsewhere [. . . ] can be held to balance the risk involved to our
maritime position in the Mediterranean by allowing France to obtain such a
mastery of the interior of Morocco”.119
According to George Monger, it was finally the situation at the Far
East, which persuaded Lord Lansdowne that “the Government’s service
advisors must be overruled and the strategic risk of concessions in Morocco
accepted”.120 On September 10, 1903 he issued a memorandum and
pushed his colleagues towards the entente. “An all-round settlement
with France upon the lines now suggested would, I believe, be enormously
to our advantage. [. . . ] A good understanding with France would not im-
probably be the precursor of better understanding with Russia, and I need
not insist upon the improvement which would result in our international
position, which, in view of our present relations with Germany as well as
Russia, I cannot regard with satisfaction.”121
Lord Cromer supported Lansdowne and they shared the same
views regarding the entente with France. He wrote to Prime Minis-
ter: “The question [. . . ] extends to far wider sphere. I cannot help regard-
ing an understanding upon all pending questions with France as possibly
a stepping-stone to a general understanding with Russia [. . . ] this possibly
may prepare the ground for some reduction in our enormous military and
naval expenditure.”122 Lansdowne believed in the same and he partic-
ularly hoped that the entente might be a stepping-stone towards an
agreement with Russia.123
Lansdowne was persuaded, that Britain could not prevent France
from penetration into Morocco and he shared the opinion of Nicolson,
that surrender in Morocco was sooner or later inevitable, because the
Frenchwere gaining positions not only in Fez but in the whole country
and “if bargains are to be made it would perhaps be prudent to arrange them
before the French have entirely occupied the field”.124 With regards to Mo-
rocco, there was another Power that Lansdowne had to reckon with –
119 Ibidem.
120MONGER, p. 132.
121Memorandum by Lansdowne, September 10, 1903. TNA, PRO, FO 27/3765, ff.
15–16.
122 Cromer to Balfour, October 15, 1903. TNA, FO 633/6, Doc. No. 340, p. 326, f. 164.
123MONGER, p. 136.
124Nicolson to Sanderson, July 26, 1903. TNA, FO 800/135, f. 163.
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Germany and it was recognized that as far as Morocco was concerned,
Germany “will do her best to make things difficult”.125
Lansdowne’s memorandum of September 10 was approved by the
Cabinet and therefore Lansdowne could send Cambon the first defi-
nite statement of the terms upon which Britain would be able to con-
clude an entente on October 1, 1903. A detailed discussion about the
general scheme of an Anglo-French entente then followed and it was
more and more clear that the proposed entente would be based on an
exchange of interests in Morocco and Egypt.126 Monson reported to
Lansdowne that “either he [Delcassé] or someone in his confidence seems
to dribble to the press at frequent intervals some of information as to the con-
tinuance of your negotiations with Cambon” and he mentioned that: “The
French would of course never have dreamed of entering on negotiation of such
extensive proportions had it not been for their hungering after Morocco, and
their fear that unless they secured that big bite at North West Africa now the
tempting morsel might eventually be snatched from their lips.”127
The next meeting, which took place on October 7, showed that the
French were unwilling to abandon their rights and privileges at New-
foundland and the British would not do so atMorocco.128 By that time,
both Lord Lansdowne and the Earl of Cromer were persuaded that
Great Britain was getting more in Egypt than she was losing in Mo-
rocco.129
Delcassé answered to Lansdowne’s proposals by letter from Oc-
tober 26 and few days later Cromer could write to Lansdowne: “the
French answer is quite as favourable as we could reasonably expect [. . . ] the
Newfoundland question seems to me the most serious task ahead [. . . ]. We
ought to be able to come to terms about Morocco and Egypt”.130 Meanwhile
in Morocco, both Governments were considering another loan to the
Sultan. Lansdowne informed Balfour about the progress of the nego-
tiations: “Cambon told me today that he had been in communication with
125MONGER, p. 134.
126ANDREW, p. 212.
127Monson to Lansdowne, October 16, 1903. TNA, FO 800/126, f. 55.
128 Lansdowne to Cambon, October 1, 1903, in: G. P. GOOCH – H.W.V. TEMPERLEY
(eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914. The Anglo-Japanese Al-
liance and the Franco-British Entente, Vol. II, London 1927, Doc. No. 370, p. 317.
129 T.G. OTTE, The Foreign Office Mind. The Making of British Foreign Policy, 1865–1914,
Cambridge 2012, p. 287; MATHEWS, p. 84.
130 Cromer to Lansdowne, October 30, 1903. TNA, FO 800/124, f. 108.
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Delcassé as to the possibilities of a further loan to the Moors. He was in-
structed to tell me that the French Government would make no objection to a
new loan on the same conditions as the loans raised in April. [. . . ] It is possi-
ble that the Spaniards may wish to come in also. Delcassé added that should
our negotiations with regard to Moors result in the establishment of an un-
derstanding of the kind proposed, the loan to be raised here would be repaid
by a new operation, which would be conducted entirely in France.”131
During October and November 1903 Cambon and Lansdowne were
finally able to come to terms regarding Morocco and Egypt, the agree-
ment was based on the lines determined earlier in the summer. A very
important measures were achieved regarding the British position in
Egypt: “In return for being given a free hand in Morocco [. . . ] France is
willing to enter into following pledges as regards Egypt – not to impede
the action of England in Egypt, nor to demand the termination of British
occupation of that country.”132 Lansdowne only refused Cambon’s pro-
posal that British advance in Egypt should go with an equal step with
the French advance in Morocco.133 Meanwhile, British Governor Gen-
eral Cromer was very anxious about the reaction of the other powers,
particularly Germany. He was as well anxious that in case British se-
cured the French consent to the abolition and to the conversion of the
Egyptian debt, theremight still be obstacles from the other Powers and
from the bondholders. Cromer therefore pushed Lansdowne to guard
against the possibility of German obstructions and he wanted to use
diplomatic support of France in order to achieve this goal. According
to Cromer’s letter from October 30, 1903, the Caisse de la Dette should
be nominally maintained on condition that the French will pledge that
they will, in case of need, address the other Powers conjointly with
Britain in order to urge them to accept the plan previously agreed by
British and French.134
After another meeting which took place on December 9, 1903,
Bafour reported to King that: “There seems no insuperable or even seri-
ous difficulty in connection with Egypt; and though Morocco still presents
131 Lansdowne to Balfour, October 28, 1903. British Library, PrimeMinister Papers, Add.
88906/17/5.
132Memorandum on the proposals fromOctober 1, 1903 and October 26, 1903. TNA, FO
27/3765, ff. 40–41.
133MONGER, p. 144.
134 Cromer to Lansdowne, October 30, 1903. TNA, FO 633/17, Doc. No. 17, pp. 27–28.
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certain point of difference, it ought not to be hard to find a way through
them.” All seemed promising but the negotiations then came later that
month to a deadlock due to the question of Newfoundland and cessa-
tion of Gambia, which was broached again by Cambon, who required
territorial compensation for the abandonment of French Shore fishing
rights.135 When Gambia was rejected, Delcassé suggested a territory
on the right bank of Niger instead. According to Monson, this terri-
tory was “infinitely more valuable than Gambia”, but Lansdowne refused
again.136
Cambon then warned Lansdowne, that “it is important to reach agree-
ment on this point before continuing our conversations on other questions”
and he emphasized that “it is useless to reach agreement on Egypt [. . . ] if
the failure of our talks on Newfoundland prevents us from making any settle-
ment”.137 The negotiations reached another deadlock in January 1904.
When Balfour heard about the situation, he wrote to Lansdowne: “I
am sorry, but not surprised at the hitch which has occurred in the French
negotiations. It would be an international misfortune if they broke down and
unsatisfactory as any negotiation must be which does not include the vexed
question of Newfoundland. I would rather that we settled Egypt, Morocco
and Siam without Newfoundland, than that we settled nothing at all. How-
ever I imagine we have not yet heard the last word.”138 But Lansdowne did
not want to leave the Newfoundland question alone and answered to
PrimeMinister that “the arrangement would be very incomplete without it,
and we shall be less liable to attack if we are able to show that we have suc-
ceeded in clearing the French, bag and baggage, out of a British colony”.139
At the same time, Cambon remindedDelcassé not to agree too hasti-
ly to the agreements. The British were more eager to settle the Egyp-
tian question than the French were to conclude an agreement over
Morocco and therefore Cambon wanted to bide their time and wait
for better offer.140 Monson reported to Lansdowne that “the time now
come in which Delcassé must consult colleagues on the general scheme of ar-
135 GOUDSWAARD, p. 113.
136Monson to Lansdowne, January 15, 1904. TNA, FO 800/126, f. 84.
137 ROLO, p. 233.
138 Balfour to Lansdowne, January 15, 1904. British Library, PrimeMinister Papers, Add.
88906/17/5.
139 Lansdowne to Balfour, January 18, 1904. Ibidem.
140 EUBANK, p. 85.
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rangement”.141 The French were annoyed by the British reluctance to
sacrifice either Gambia or territory in Western Africa in return for the
Newfoundland issue. Lansdowne argued that “our position in Egypt
is practically unassailable, although we should be glad to regularize it. [. . . ]
In France, on the other hand, France had no position corresponding to ours
in Egypt, and we should certainly be told that we were retreating ignomin-
iously from that country”.142 Cambon opposed that “France, for instance,
would still have to negotiate with Spain, and perhaps with the other Powers,
about Morocco, and she could, if she chose, make herself very inconvenient
to us in Egypt”.143 The French were exasperated and George Cogor-
dan, Director of Political Affairs at the Quai d’Orsay informed French
Consul General in Egypt: “The negotiations with the Great Britain were
interrupted [. . . ] it would be desirable if you visited lord Cromer and in-
formed him about the possible failure of the negotiations unless some fairly
valuable territorial concessions were made.”144 Two days later, Cromer ca-
bled to Lansdowne that “the information received by me leaves little room
for doubt that serious danger of the breakdown of the negotiations exists. The
necessity of making concessions [. . . ] appears to me most urgent”.145
At the end of February, Lansdowne informed the Spanish Govern-
ment that the negotiations about Morocco had already started.146 De-
spite this step Lansdowne finally caved in to French pressure and al-
lowed France to negotiate with Spain separately.147 Madrid would be
informed of the final statement once this was already settled between
France and Great Britain.148 On March 4, 1904, the question of territo-
rial compensation in the area of Nigeria and Lake Chad were raised
141Monson to Lansdowne, January 15, 1904. TNA, FO 800/126, f. 84.
142 Lansdowne to Monson, January 13, 1904. TNA, FO 633/17, Doc. No. 32, pp. 44–45.
143 Ibidem.
144 Cogordan to De la Bouliniere, January 19, 1904. DDF, Série II, Tome IV, Paris 1932,
Doc. No. 198, p. 274.
145 Cromer to Lansdowne, January 21, 1904. TNA, FO 633/17, Doc. No. 36, pp. 46–47.
146MATHEWS, p. 92; ROLO, p. 247.
147During November of 1903, Lansdowne informed Cromer about the note by Paul
Cambon, which commented an existing draft of entente between France and Spain.
According to Lansdowne Cambon’s note contained such a declaration, by which
Spain and France prohibited any cessation of the Moroccan territory to any third
Power. Lord Lansdownewarned that this would not prevent Spain from ceding them
to France. See Lansdowne to Cromer, November 13, 1903. TNA, FO 800/124, ff. 128–
129.
148 ROLO, p. 237.
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and after nine days both powers reached a compromise. The long dis-
cussions about the territorial changes were therefore completed.149 On
March 13, France and England then agreed, that the question of New-
foundland should be arranged by a special convention.150
Both powers finally came to terms on April 6, 1904 and Lansdowne
informed the King in his letter later that day that the mutual Anglo-
French negotiations are leading to the successful conclusion: “I beg to
inform Your Majesty that my discussion with French ambassador has pro-
ceeded satisfactorily and that I hope to reach a final agreement tomorrow.
As Parliament is not sitting I think that no announcement should yet be
made.”151 The agreement was signed two days later at Chateau Clouds
and consisted of three documents, the Convention between the United
Kingdom and France respecting Newfoundland and West and Cen-
tral Africa, the Declaration between the United Kingdom and France
respecting Egypt and Morocco with five Secret Articles and the Dec-
laration between the United Kingdom and France concerning Siam,
Madagascar and the New Hebrides.152 All the pending colonial dis-
putes in non-European territories were to be settled between France
and England through what later became known as the Entente Cor-
diale.
By the Entente Cordiale the friction between France and England
in non-European territories was removed. The colonial rivalry was
ended and the mutual relations between both great powers were fi-
nally smoothed out. France abandoned the policy of pinpricks in
Egypt in exchange for the policy of a free hand in Morocco, but the
struggle over Morocco was still not ended. However, the main oppo-
nent was not Britain, but Germany and the fate of Morocco was to be
determined seven years later.
149 Lansdowne to Monson, March 13, 1904. In: BD 2, Doc. No. 399, p. 354; ROLO, p. 253.
150D. VILLEPIN, L’Entente Cordiale de Fachoda à la Grande Guerre dans les archives du Quai
d’Orsay. Dans les archives du Quai d’Orsay, Bruxelles – Paris 2004, p. 90.
151 Lansdowne to Edward VII, April 6, 1904. British Library, Lansdowne Papers, Add.
88906/19/25.
152 Convention signed at London, April 8, 1904. TNA, FO 633/17, Doc. No. 95, pp. 123–
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